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188 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
der to make an affidavit there must be present the officer, the affiant, and
the paper, and there must be something done which amounts to the adminis-
tration of an oath. There must be some solemnity, not mere telephone talk.
Telephonic affidavits are unknown to the law. A moment's thought will
show a sound reason for th. An officer hears a voice coming thru the re-
ociver of a telephone. For identification he must rely on recognition of the
voice (if he knows it) and the statement of the person as to who he or she
is. How does 2he notary know that the paper presented later is the identical
paper sworn to? If this is an oath, when is it taken-when the telephone
message is sent, or when the paper is later presented by the third person?
Where is it taken-.* the place where the affiant is. or that where the officer
is? It will be seen that great confusion might arise from such a system."
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT--CONTINGENT FEE-DISMISSAL O(F
SUIT BY CLIENT.
Kellogg v. Winchell, 273 Fed. 745 (D. C.) The plaintiff directed his at-
txney, who was engaged upon a onitingent fee, to dismiss an appeal from a
judgment against him in the lower court.
It is well established that a client may dismiss his attorney at any time
and without cause, although this attorney be employed on a contingent fee.
Ronald v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Amoc. 30 Fed. 228; Roake v. Palmer,
103 N. Y. S. 862; Joseph v. Lopp 78 S. W. 1119 (Ky.). But the courts will
not permit such act of dismissal to deprive the attorney of renumeration
for services rendered. There are three ways in case of contingent fees in
which attorney may recover for services. (1) The Attorney may sue his client
in cotra.L Kersey v. Gorton, 77 Mo 645; Reynolds v. Clark 162 Mo680.
The objectionable feature to this remedy is that it seems impossible to deter-
mine damages if this suit is not concluded.
(2) The agreen4t nmy be treated as a mere promise to pay a pQrt of
a claim when collected. Story v. Hull, 143 IlL, 506.
(3) This remedy is to allow the attorney a quantum meruit for the
reasonable value of his wrvices. Ibert v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 213 Fed- 996
(D. C.). Jordan v. Davis 172 Mo, 599; Moonm v. Robinon 92 III. 491; Phil-
brook v. Moxey 191 Mass. 33. And this appears to be the most reasonabk
and just osIU to follow.
DOWER-CREDITORS' RIGHTS BEFORE IT IS ASSIGNED.
The recent case of Clelland v. Celland, 235 S. W. (Mo.) 816, was an
action to have a widow's dower assigned in her husbands real estate, brought
by a judgment creditor of the widow to satisfy his claim out of the portion
so assigned. Sec. 347, R. S. Mibeouri 1919, provides that if dower has not
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